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Abstract  
The emergence of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) 
technology advocates self-organized wireless interconnection of 
communication devices that would either extend or operate in 
concert with the wired networking infrastructure or, possibly, 
evolve to autonomous networks. In either case, the proliferation of 
MANET-based applications depends on a multitude of factors, with 
trustworthiness being one of the primary challenges to be met. 
Despite the existence of well-known security mechanisms, 
additional vulnerabilities and features pertinent to this new 
networking paradigm might render such traditional solutions 
inapplicable. In particular, the absence of a central authorization 
facility in an open and distributed communication environment is a 
major challenge, especially due to the need for cooperative 
network operation. In particular, in MANET, any node may 
compromise the routing protocol functionality by disrupting the 
route discovery process. In this paper, we present a route discovery 
protocol that mitigates the detrimental effects of such malicious 
behavior, as to provide correct connectivity information. Our 
protocol guarantees that fabricated, compromised, or replayed 
route replies would either be rejected or never reach back the 
querying node. Furthermore, the protocol responsiveness is 
safeguarded under different types of attacks that exploit the routing 
protocol itself. The sole requirement of the proposed scheme is the 
existence of a security association between the node initiating the 
query and the sought destination. Specifically, no assumption is 
made regarding the intermediate nodes, which may exhibit 
arbitrary and malicious behavior. The scheme is robust in the 
presence of a number of non-colluding nodes, and provides 
accurate routing information in a timely manner. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The provision of security services in the MANET context 
faces a set of challenges specific to this new technology. 
The insecurity of the wireless links, energy constraints, 
relatively poor physical protection of nodes in a hostile 
environment, and the vulnerability of statically configured 
security schemes have been identified [4,5] in literature as 
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such challenges. Nevertheless, the single most important 
feature that differentiates MANET is the absence of a fixed 
infrastructure. No part of the network is dedicated to support 
individually any specific network functionality, with routing 
(topology discovery, data forwarding) being the most 
prominent example. Additional examples of functions that 
cannot rely on a central service, and which are also of high 
relevance to this work, are naming services, certification 
authorities (CA), directory and other administrative services.  
Even if such services were assumed, their availability 
would not be guaranteed, either due to the dynamically 
changing topology that could easily result in a partitioned 
network, or due to congested links close to the node acting 
as a server. Furthermore, performance issues such as delay 
constraints on acquiring responses from the assumed 
infrastructure would pose an additional challenge.  
The absence of infrastructure and the consequent absence 
of authorization facilities impede the usual practice of 
establishing a line of defense, separating nodes into trusted 
and non-trusted. Such a distinction would have been based 
on a security policy, the possession of the necessary 
credentials and the ability for nodes to validate them. In the 
MANET context, there may be no ground for an a priori 
classification, since all nodes are required to cooperate in 
supporting the network operation, while no prior security 
association can be assumed for all the network nodes. 
Additionally, in MANET freely roaming nodes form 
transient associations with their neighbors, join and leave 
MANET sub-domains independently and without notice. 
Thus it may be difficult in most cases to have a clear picture 
of the ad hoc network membership. Consequently, 
especially in the case of a large-size network, no form of 
established trust relationships among the majority of nodes 
could be assumed. 
In such an environment, there is no guarantee that a path 
between two nodes would be free of malicious nodes, which 
would not comply with the employed protocol and attempt 
to harm the network operation. The mechanisms currently 
incorporated in MANET routing protocols cannot cope with 
disruptions due to malicious behavior. For example, any 
node could claim that is one hop away from the sought 
destination, causing all routes to the destination to pass 
through itself. Alternatively, a malicious node could corrupt 
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any in-transit route request (reply) packet and cause data to 
be misrouted.  
 The presence of even a small number of adversarial 
nodes could result in repeatedly compromised routes, and, as 
a result, the network nodes would have to rely on cycles of 
time-out and new route discoveries to communicate. This 
would incur arbitrary delays before the establishment of a 
non-corrupted path, while successive broadcasts of route 
requests would impose excessive transmission overhead. In 
particular, intentionally falsified routing messages would 
result in a denial-of-service (DoS) experienced by the end 
nodes. The proposed here scheme combats such types of 
misbehavior and safeguards the acquisition of topological 
information.  
Our scheme guarantees that a node initiating a route 
discovery will be able to identify and discard replies 
providing false topological information, or, avoid receiving 
them. Our protocol departs from the Internet related 
solutions [2], which require the existence of a trust structure 
that encompasses all nodes participating in routing, and may 
rely on network management operations to detect routing 
instabilities. Moreover, the novelty of our scheme, as 
compared with other MANET secure routing schemes, is that 
false route replies, as a result of malicious node behavior, 
are discarded partially by benign nodes while in-transit 
towards the querying node, or deemed invalid upon 
reception. Most importantly, the above-mentioned goals are 
achieved with the existence of a security association 
between the pair of end nodes only, without the need for 
intermediate nodes to cryptographically validate control 
traffic.  
The widely accepted technique in the MANET context of 
route discovery based on broadcasting query packets is the 
basis of our protocol. More specifically, as query packets 
traverse the network, the relaying intermediate nodes 
append their identifier (e.g., IP address) in the query packet 
header. When one or more queries arrive at the sought 
destination, replies that contain the accumulated routes are 
returned to the querying node; the source then may use one 
or more of these routes to forward its data.  Reliance on this 
basic route query broadcasting mechanism allows our 
proposed here Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) to be applied 
as an extension of a multitude of existing routing protocols. 
In particular, the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [8] and the 
IERP [13] of the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [14] 
framework are two protocols that can be extended in a 
natural way to incorporate SRP. Furthermore, other 
protocols such as ABR [15] for example, could be combined 
with SRP with minimal modifications to achieve the security 
goals of the SRP protocol.  
SRP guarantees the acquisition of correct topological 
information in a timely manner, i.e., the route replies that 
are validated and accepted by the querying node provide 
accurate connectivity information, despite the presence of 
strong adversaries. The protocol is proven robust against a 
set of attacks that attempt to compromise the route 
discovery, under the assumption of non-colluding 
adversarial nodes.   
In the sequel, we review schemes related to the problem 
at hand and then present our scheme. First, a concise 
overview is provided, followed by the detailed definition in 
section D. The analysis of the protocol is given next, with a 
discussion of related issues in section F. 
 
B. RELATED WORK 
Outside the MANET community, secure routing in the 
Internet has, of course, received increased attention [2]. The 
proposed solutions rely mainly on the existence of a line of 
defense, separating the fixed routing infrastructure from all 
other network entities. This is achieved by distributing a set 
of public keys/certificates, which signify the authority of the 
router to act within the limits of the employed protocol (e.g., 
advertise certain routes), and allow all routing data 
exchanges to be authenticated, non-repudiated and protected 
from tampering. However, such approaches cannot combat a 
single malicious router disseminating incorrect topological 
information. More importantly, they are not applicable in 
the MANET context, because of impediments such as the 
absence of a fixed infrastructure and a central entity. 
Despite the fact that security of MANET routing protocols 
is envisioned to be a major “roadblock” in commercial 
application of this technology, only a limited number of 
works has been published in this area. Such efforts have 
mostly concentrated on the aspect of data forwarding, 
disregarding the aspect of topology discovery. On the other 
hand, solutions that target route discovery have been based 
on approaches for fixed-infrastructure networks, defying the 
particular MANET challenges. 
For the problem of secure data forwarding, two 
mechanisms that (i) detect misbehaving nodes and report 
such events and (ii) maintain a set of metrics reflecting the 
past behavior of other nodes [23] have been proposed to 
alleviate the detrimental effects of packet dropping. Each 
node may choose the ‘best’ route, comprised of relatively 
well-behaved nodes; i.e., nodes that do not have history of 
avoiding forwarding packets along established routes. 
Among the assumptions for the above-mentioned work are a 
shared medium, bi-directional links, use of source routing 
(i.e., packets carry the entire route that becomes known to 
all intermediate nodes), and no colluding malicious nodes. 
Nodes operating in promiscuous mode overhear the 
transmissions of their successors and may verify whether the 
packet was forwarded to the downstream node and check the 
integrity of the forwarded packet. Upon detection of a 
misbehaving node, a report is generated and nodes update 
the rating of the reported misbehaving node. The ratings of 
nodes along a well-behaved route are periodically 
incremented, while reception of a misbehavior alert 
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dramatically decreases the node rating.1 When a new route 
is required, the source node calculates a path metric equal to 
the average of the ratings of the nodes in each of the route 
replies, and selects the route with the highest metric. 
  The detection mechanism exploits two features that 
frequently appear in MANET:  the use of a shared channel 
and source routing. Nevertheless, the plausibility of this 
solution could be questioned for several reasons and, indeed, 
the authors provide a short list of scenarios of incorrect 
detection. The possibility of falsely detecting misbehaving 
nodes could easily create a situation with many nodes 
falsely suspected for a long period of time. In addition, the 
metric construction may lead to a route choice that includes 
a suspected node, if, for example, the number of hops is 
relatively high, so that a low rating is “averaged out.” 
Finally, the most important vulnerability is the proposed 
feedback itself; there is no way for the source, or any other 
node that receives a misbehavior report to validate its 
authenticity or correctness. Consequently, the simplest 
attack would be to generate fake alerts and eventually 
disable the network operation altogether. The protocol 
attempts new route discoveries when none of the route 
replies is free of suspected nodes, with the excessive route 
request traffic degrading the network performance. At the 
same time, the adversary can falsely accuse a significant 
fraction of nodes within the time-out period related to 
reinstating from a negative rating and, essentially, partition 
the network.   
A different approach [24] is to provide incentive to 
nodes, so that they comply with protocol rules; i.e., properly 
relay user data. The concept of fictitious currency is 
introduced, in order to endogenize the behavior of the 
assumed greedy nodes, which would forward packets in 
exchange for currency. Each intermediate node purchases 
from its predecessor the received data packet and sells it to 
its successor along the path to the destination. Eventually 
the destination pays for the received packet.2 This scheme 
assumes the existence of an overlaid geographic routing 
infrastructure and a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). All 
nodes are pre-loaded with an amount of currency, have 
unique identifiers, are associated with a pair of 
private/public keys and all cryptographic operations related 
to the currency transfers are performed by a physically 
tamper-resistant module. The applicability of the scheme, 
which targets wide-area MANET, is limited by the 
assumption of an on-line Certification Authority in the 
                                               
1
 The initial rating, 0.5, is increased by 0.01 every 200 ms. 
Suspected nodes have a rating equal to –100, with the option 
for a long timeout period after which the negative rating is 
changed back to a positive value.   
2
 An alternative implementation, with each packet carrying a 
purse of fictitious currency from which nodes remove their 
reward, faces different challenges as well.  
MANET context. Moreover, nodes could flood the network 
with packets destined to non-existent nodes and possibly 
lead nodes unable to forward purchased packets to 
starvation. The practicality of the scheme is also limited by 
its assumptions, the high computational overhead (hop-by-
hop public key cryptography, for each transmitted packet), 
and the implementation of physically tamper-resistant 
modules. 
The protection of the route discovery process has been 
regarded as an additional Quality-of-Service (QoS) issue 
[17], by choosing routes that satisfy certain quantifiable 
security criteria. In particular, nodes in a MANET subnet are 
classified into different trust and privilege levels. A node 
initiating a route discovery sets the sought security level for 
the route; i.e., the required minimal trust level for nodes 
participating in the query/reply propagation. Nodes at each 
trust level share symmetric encryption and decryption keys. 
Intermediate nodes of different levels cannot decrypt in-
transit routing packets, or determine whether the required 
QoS parameter can be satisfied, and simply drop them. 
Although this scheme provides protection (e.g., integrity) of 
the routing protocol traffic, it does not eliminate false 
routing information provided by malicious nodes. Moreover, 
the proposed use of symmetric cryptography allows any 
node to corrupt the routing protocol operation within a level 
of trust, by mounting virtually any attack that would be 
possible without the presence of the scheme. Finally, the 
assumed supervising organization and the fixed assignment 
of trust levels does not pertain to the MANET paradigm. In 
essence, the proposed solution transcribes the problem of 
secure routing in a context where nodes of a certain group 
are assumed to be trustworthy, without actually addressing 
the global secure routing problem.  
An extension of the Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) [16] routing protocol has been proposed [18] to 
protect the routing protocol messages. The Secure-AODV 
scheme assumes that each node has certified public keys of 
all network nodes, so that intermediate nodes can validate 
all in-transit routing packets. The basic idea is that the 
originator of a control message appends an RSA signature 
[19] and the last element of a hash chain [20] (i.e., the result 
of n consecutive hash calculations on a random number). As 
the message traverses the network, intermediate nodes 
cryptographically validate the signature and the hash value, 
generate the k-th element of the hash chain, with k being the 
number of traversed hops, and place it in the packet. The 
route replies are provided either by the destination or 
intermediate nodes having an active route to the sought 
destination, with the latter mode of operation enabled by a 
different type of control packets.  
The use of public-key cryptography imposes a high 
processing overhead on the intermediate nodes and can be 
considered unrealistic for a wide range of network instances. 
Furthermore, it is possible for intermediate nodes to corrupt 
In Proceedings of the SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and 
Simulation Conference (CNDS 2002), San Antonio, TX, January 27-31, 2002 
 
 4 
the route discovery by pretending that the destination is their 
immediate neighbor, advertising arbitrarily high sequence 
numbers and altering (either decreasing by one or arbitrarily 
increasing) the actual route length. Additional vulnerabilities 
stem from the fact that the IP portion of the S-AODV traffic 
can be trivially compromised, since it is not (and cannot be, 
due to the AODV operation) protected, unless additional 
hop-by-hop cryptography and accumulation of signatures is 
used. Finally, the assumption that certificates are bound with 
IP addresses is unrealistic; roaming nodes joining MANET 
sub-domains will be assigned IP addresses dynamically 
(e.g., DHCP [21]) or even randomly (e.g., Zero-
Configuration [22]). 
A different approach is taken by the Secure Message 
Transmission (SMT) [1] protocol, which, given a topology 
view of the network, determines a set of diverse paths 
connecting the source and the destination nodes. Then, it 
introduces limited transmission redundancy across the paths, 
by dispersing a message into N pieces, so that successful 
reception of any M-out-of-N pieces allows the 
reconstruction of the original message at the destination. 
Each piece, equipped with a cryptographic header that 
provides integrity and replay protection along with origin 
authentication and is transmitted over one of the paths. 
Upon reception of a number of pieces, the destination 
generates an acknowledgement informing the source of 
which pieces, and thus routes, were intact. In order to 
enhance the robustness of the feedback mechanism, the 
small-sized acknowledgments are maximally dispersed (i.e., 
successful reception of at least one piece is sufficient) and 
are protected by the protocol header as well. If less than M 
pieces were received, the source re-transmits the remaining 
pieces over the intact routes. If too few pieces were 
acknowledged or too many messages remain outstanding, 
the protocol adapts its operation, by determining a different 
path set, re-encoding undelivered messages and re-allocating 
pieces over the path set. Otherwise, it proceeds with 
subsequent message transmissions.  
The protocol exploits MANET features such as the 
topological redundancy, interoperates widely with accepted 
techniques such as source routing, relies on a security 
association between the source and the destination, and 
makes use of highly efficient symmetric-key cryptography. 
It does not impose processing overhead on intermediate 
nodes, while the end nodes make the routing decisions, 
based on the feedback provided by the destination and the 
underlying topology discovery and route maintenance 
protocols. The fault-tolerance of SMT is enhanced by the 
adaptation of parameters such as the number of paths and 
the dispersion factor (i.e., the ratio of required pieces to the 
total number of pieces). SMT can yield 100% successful 
message reception, even if 10 to 20 percent of the network 
nodes are malicious. Moreover, algorithms for the selection 
of path sets with different properties, based on different 
metrics and the network feedback, can be implemented by 
SMT. SMT provides a flexible, end-to-end, secure traffic 
engineering scheme tailored to the MANET characteristics. 
It is noteworthy that SMT provides a limited protection 
against the use of compromised topological information, 
although its main focus is to safeguard the data forwarding 
operation. The use of multiple routes compensates for the 
use of partially incorrect routing information [4], rendering a 
compromised route equivalent to a route failure. 
Nevertheless, the disruption of the route discovery can still 
be the most effective way for adversaries to consistently 
compromise the communication of one or more pairs of 
nodes. This is where SRP can complement SMT. 
SRP safeguards the route discovery and makes use of 
cryptographic tools, an indispensable requirement for any 
security scheme. Only the end nodes have to be securely 
associated, and there is no need for cryptographic validation 
of control traffic at intermediate nodes, two factors that 
render the scheme efficient and scalable. SRP places the 
overhead on the end nodes, an appropriate choice for a 
highly decentralized environment, and contributes to the 
robustness and flexibility of the scheme. Moreover, SRP 
does not rely on state stored in intermediate nodes, thus is 
immune to malicious acts not directed against the nodes that 
wish to communicate in a secure manner. Finally, SRP 
provides one or more route replies, whose correctness is 
verified by the route “geometry” itself. A querying node 
acquires correct network connectivity information and the 
ability to choose an optimal route, with respect to the 
number of hops or another criterion. At the same time, the 
overall routing and control traffic overhead under highly 
adverse conditions is reduced, and protection of the end 
nodes against attacks that aim at exhausting their resources, 
is provided. 
 
C. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
C.1. Basic Assumptions 
We focus on bi-directional communication between a 
pair of nodes. A security association (SA) between the 
source node S and the destination node T is assumed. The 
trust relationship could be instantiated, for example, by the 
knowledge of the public key of the other communicating 
end. The two nodes can negotiate a shared secret key, e.g., 
via the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm [7,12], and 
then, using the SA, verify that the principal that participated 
in the exchange was indeed the trusted node. For the rest of 
the discussion, we assume the existence of a shared key KS,T. 
The SA is bi-directional in that the shared key can be used 
for control (data) traffic flow in both directions. Relevant 
state has to be maintained for each direction though. 
The existence of the SA is justified, because the end hosts 
chose to employ a secure communication scheme and, 
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consequently, should be able to authenticate each other. For 
example, such a group (pair) of nodes could have performed 
a secure key exchange [10], or an initial distribution of 
credentials. However, the existence of SA’s with any of the 
intermediate nodes is unnecessary. Finally, it is required that 
end nodes be able to use static or non-volatile memory.  
The adversarial nodes may attempt to compromise the 
network operation by exhibiting arbitrary, Byzantine 
behavior [3]. They are able to corrupt, replay, and fabricate 
routing packets. They may attempt to misroute them in any 
possible manner and, in general, they cannot be expected to 
properly execute the routing protocol. Although a set of 
malicious nodes may mount attacks against the protocol 
concurrently, we assume that nodes are not capable of 
colluding within one step of the protocol execution; that is, 
within the period of broadcasting one query and reception of 
the corresponding replies. For clarification, we discuss 
below an attack mounted by two colluding nodes during a 
single route discovery.  
The underlying data link layer (e.g., IEEE 802.11 [6]) 
provides reliable transmission on a link basis, without any 
requirement of data link security services, such as the Wired 
Equivalent Protocol (WEP) function. Moreover, links are 
assumed to be bi-directional, a requirement fulfilled by most 
of the proposed medium access control protocols, especially 
the ones employing the RTS/CTS dialogue. It is also 
expected that a one-to-one mapping between Medium 
Access Control and IP addresses exists. Finally, the 
broadcast nature of the radio channel mandates that each 
transmission is received by all neighbors, which are 
assumed to operate in promiscuous mode.3 
 
C.2. Overview 
Our work provides a novel approach to the secure route 
discovery operation for MANET routing protocols.  
The proposed here scheme combats attacks that disrupt the 
route discovery process and guarantees, under the above-
mentioned assumptions, the acquisition of correct 
topological information. It also incorporates mechanisms 
that safeguard the network functionality from attacks 
exploiting the protocol itself, in order to degrade network 
performance and possibly lead to denial of service.  
 The source node S initiates the route discovery, by 
constructing a route request packet identified by a pair of 
identifiers: a query sequence number and a random query 
identifier. The source and destination and the unique (with 
respect to the pair of end nodes) query identifiers are the 
input for the calculation of the Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) [9], along with KS,T. In addition, the identities 
                                               
3
 I.e., able to overhear all transmissions from nodes 
within the range of their transceiver 
 
(IP addresses) of the traversed intermediate nodes are 
accumulated in the route request packet.   
Intermediate nodes relay route requests, so that one or 
more query packets arrive at the destination, and maintain a 
limited amount of state information regarding the relayed 
queries, so that previously seen route requests are discarded. 
Moreover, they provide feedback in the event of a path 
breakage, and in some cases they may provide route replies, 
as explained in section D.5.  
The route requests reach the destination T, which 
constructs the route replies; it calculates a MAC covering the 
route reply contents and returns the packet to S over the 
reverse of the route accumulated in the respective request 
packet. The destination responds to one or more request 
packets of the same query, so that it provides the source 
with an as diverse topology picture as possible.4 The 
querying node validates the replies and updates its topology 
view. 
As an illustrative example, consider the topology of 
Fig.1, comprising ten nodes. S queries the network to 
discover one or more routes to T. The nodes M1 and M2 are 
two malicious intermediate nodes. We denote the query 
request as a list {QS,T;n1,n2,..,nk}, with QS,T denoting the SRP 
header for a query searching for T and initiated by S. The ni, 
i≠{1,k}, are the IP addresses of the traversed intermediate 
nodes and n1=S, nk=T. Similarly, the route reply is denoted 
as {RS,T;n1,n2,..,nk}. We now consider a number of scenarios 
of possible security attacks by the two malicious nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example Topology: S wishes to discover a route 
to T in the presence of two malicious nodes, M1 and M2. 
 
Scenario 1: Consider the case that when M1 receives 
{QS,T;S}, it attempts to mislead S by generating  
{RS,T;S,M1,T}. Not only would S accept such a reply, if a 
regular routing protocol were used, but it would most 
probably choose this fake route, since {S,M1,T} would have 
fewer hops than any other legitimate reply. It would also be 
received with the least delay, because of the close distance 
between M1 and S. The requirement that the request reaches 
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 The number of replies and the time-window the destination 
allocates for replies to a specific query are design 
parameters. Moreover, the source could provide an indicator 
of the required diversity, so that T can regulate the number 
of replies.   
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the destination disallows any intermediate node to provide a 
reply in this manner, and, the false reply packet is discarded, 
since M1 does not possess KS,T   and cannot generate a valid 
MAC. 
Scenario 2: Consider the case in which M1 discards 
request packets arriving from its neighbors, excluding the 
one from node 1. This type of malicious act cannot be 
countered, but the controlled flooding of the query packets 
provides the required robustness. By discarding route 
request packets, a malicious node partially narrows the 
topology view of S and, to some extend, impedes the 
network operation. In essence, the malicious node can 
always hide its incident links, but at the same time it 
practically removes itself from S’s view. Thus, it cannot 
inflict harm to data flows originating from S, since the 
routes chosen by S would simply exclude M1.  
Scenario 3: As assumed above, M1 sees and appropriately 
relays {QS,T;S,1,M1}; upon arrival of {QS,T;S,1,M1,5,4} at T, 
the reply is generated and routed over the reverse path. 
When M1 receives {RS,T;S,1,M1,5,4,T}, it tampers with its 
content and relays {RS,T;S,1,M1,Y,T}, with Y being any 
invented sequence of nodes. S readily discards the reply, due 
to the integrity protection provided by the MAC.    
Scenario 4: When M2 receives {QS,T;S,2,3}, it corrupts the 
accumulated route and relays {QS,T;S,X,3,M2} to its 
neighbors, where X is a false, invented IP address (or, any 
sequence of IP addresses). This request arrives at T, which 
constructs the reply and routes it over {T,M2,3,X,S} towards 
S. When node 3 receives the reply, it cannot forward it any 
further, since X is not its neighbor, and the reply is dropped. 
Scenario 5: In order to consume network resources, M1 
replays route requests, which are discarded by intermediate 
nodes, since they maintain a list of query identifiers seen in 
the past. This is achieved by the underlying routing protocol 
itself, within the limitations imposed by the size of the query 
table. But queries replayed after a significant period of time, 
will propagate across the network and arrive at T. The query 
sequence number, used only by the end nodes for the query 
identification, allows T to discard such queries. If the 
request header were corrupted, the query would also be 
discarded. Similarly, T discards fabricated route requests, 
since malicious nodes cannot generate valid request MAC.  
Scenario 6: Assume that M1, after observing a few route 
requests originating from S, fabricates several queries with 
the subsequent query identifiers. The goal of this attack is to 
make intermediate nodes store these identifiers and discard 
legitimate, future {QS,T;n1,…,nj} route requests. The cost of 
this attack is low (a single route request transmission per 
identifier) and, with the Time-To-Live (TTL) field of the 
query packet set to a high value, the affected network area 
may be significantly large. The query identifier values used 
by intermediate nodes implementing SRP are ‘unique’ and 
random, unlike the query identification field of existing on-
demand routing protocols, whose values are a monotonically 
increasing sequence. Consequently, such an attack cannot 
practically affect the protocol operation, because of the 
extremely low probability of predicting the query identifiers. 
Scenario 7: Node M1 attempts to forward {QS,T;S,M*};  
i.e., it spoofs an IP address. Such an act is possible and at 
the routing protocol level the query would propagate 
through the network and reach T. Consequently, S would 
accept {RS,T;S,M*,1,4,T} as a route. It is apparent that the 
connectivity information conveyed by such a reply is 
correct. Indeed, all that M1 would achieve is to mask its 
identity, which in general will be temporary. Thus, the 
malicious node would not achieve anything more than its 
placement on a potential S→T route, which would have 
been possible in the first place, without any IP spoofing. 
Scenario 8: Now, let us assume that M1 attempts to return 
a number of replies, each with a different spoofed IP 
address, namely, Mi,Mi+1,…Mi+j, i.e., an “extension” of 
Scenario 7. This would lead S to believe that a multitude of 
possible routes to T exist, although, in reality, all of these 
routes are controlled by M1. As explained in Scenario 1, M1 
is not allowed to generate replies, and thus fabricate ones 
that contain the spoofed addresses. An alternative way for 
M1 to mount this attack would be to relay more than one 
route requests, placing a different IP address in each of 
them; T would generate the corresponding replies, M1 would 
relay them back towards the source, and S would have no 
choice but to accept them. Fortunately, such an attack is 
successfully countered by our protocol: M1’s neighbors relay 
only one route request, with specific source and target nodes 
and query identifier. For example, nodes 1,3 and 5 will relay 
the first of such queries and drop subsequent packets as 
previously seen requests, thanks to the broadcast channel. If 
M1 modified the query identifier, the forged query would be 
forwarded, but T would detect the alteration, due to the 
MAC, and drop the request.  
The only possible attack against the protocol would be if 
nodes colluded during the two phases of a single route 
discovery. In such a case, they would manage to make the 
source node to accept partially false routing information. For 
example, in Fig.1, when M1 receives the route request, it can 
tunnel it to M2; i.e. discover a route to M2 and send the 
request encapsulated in a data packet. Then, M2 broadcasts a 
request with the route segment between M1 and M2 falsified, 
e.g. {QS,T;S,M1,Z,M2}. T receives the request and constructs 
a reply, which is routed over {T,M2,Z,M1,S}. M2 receives the 
reply and tunnels it back to M1, which, then, returns it to S. 
As a result, the connectivity information is only partially 
correct (in this example, only the first and last link). 
However, one pair of colluding nodes can convince S of 
only a single false path that will include the two nodes. The 
reason is that M2 cannot forward a number of requests 
towards T using spoofed IP addresses, as explained above. 
Special care is needed for a case similar to Fig.1, where M2 
is adjacent to T, with countermeasures discussed in the 
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sequel. In particular, the application of SMT on top of the 
proposed here secure routing protocol can further mitigate 
the impact of an attack mounted by colluding nodes. 
 
D. DETAILED PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) introduces a set of 
new features that can be incorporated in the context of the 
underlying basis protocol with low overhead. In principle, it 
can retain mechanisms, such as the control of the query 
propagation, the rate of query generation, and the neighbor 
discovery protocol, if present. SRP extends the basic 
protocol by enforcing rules on the format and propagation of 
route request, route reply, and the error messages, by 
introducing the required additional functionality. 
 In short, SRP makes efficient use of the security 
association between the two communicating nodes S and T. 
Route request packets verifiably propagate to the destination 
(in the general case) and route replies are returned to S 
strictly over the reversed route, as accumulated in the route 
request packet. Similarly, route error messages can only be 
generated by nodes that lie on the route that is reported as 
broken. In order to guarantee this functionality of crucial 
importance, SRP determines explicitly the interaction with 
the network layer; i.e., the IP-related functionality. 
Furthermore, it provides a novel way of query identification, 
which protects the query propagation and the end-nodes 
from DoS attacks. Finally, propagating query packets are 
handled locally by a priority scheme that enhances the 
robustness and the responsiveness of the protocol. 
 
 0                            1     2                            3 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
IP Header 
Basis Routing Protocol Packet 
SRP Header 
 
Figure 2. SRP as an extension of a reactive routing protocol: 
the SRP header (shown in detail in Fig. 3) is appended to the 
basis routing protocol header (shaded area). 
 
The features introduced by SRP require the addition of a 
6-word header, as shown in Fig.3. The SRP Header is 
integrated into the underlying protocol header structure as 
an additional IP option (Fig.2), and covers most parts of the 
routing protocol datagram. Different types of SRP messages 
are distinguished with the help of the 1-byte Type field. In 
this work, we primarily consider the augmentation of route 
request and reply packets and in the sequel each message 
type is described individually. However, it is possible for 
SRP to operate in a more general setting, where, for 
example, a route reply is appended to a data packet. 
 
D.1. Route Request 
A source node S maintains a Query Sequence number 
Qseq for each destination it securely communicates with. 
This 32-bit sequence number increases monotonically, for 
each route request generated by S, and allows T to detect 
outdated route requests. The sequence number is initialized 
at the establishment of the SA and although it is not allowed 
to wrap around, it provides approximately a space of four 
billion query requests per destination. If the entire space is 
used, a new security association has to be established, in one 
of the ways described in C.1.  
 
 0                            1     2                            3 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
Type Reserved 
Query Identifier 
Query Sequence Number 
SRP MAC 
 
Figure 3. SRP Header: for a pair of source and destination 
nodes, the control message, identified by its Type, is 
uniquely distinguished by the pair of identifiers. The 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) covers parts of the 
message, depending on its type.  
 
For each outgoing Route Request, S generates a 32-bit 
random Query Identifier QID, which is used by intermediate 
nodes as a means to identify the request. QID is the output of 
a secure pseudorandom number generator [11]; its output is 
statistically indistinguishable from a truly random one and is 
unpredictable by an adversary with limited computational 
power. Since intermediate nodes have limited memory of 
past queries, uniqueness and randomness can be efficiently 
achieved, by using a one-way function (e.g., SHA-1 [27]) 
and a small random seed as input. This renders the 
prediction of the query identifiers practically impossible, 
and combats an attack where malicious nodes simply 
broadcast fabricated requests only to cause subsequent 
legitimate queries to be dropped.  
 Both QID and Qseq are placed in the SRP header, along 
with appropriate Type value and the Request Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). The MAC is a 96-bit long field, 
generated by a keyed hash algorithm [9], which calculates 
the truncated output of a one-way or hash function (e.g., 
SHA-1 or MD5 [28]). The one-way function input is the 
entire IP header, the basis protocol route request packet and 
most importantly, the shared key KS,T. The Route Request 
fields that are updated as the packet propagates towards the 
destination, i.e., the accumulated addresses of the 
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intermediate nodes, and the IP-header mutable fields are 
excluded.  
 
D.2. Query Handling/Propagation  
Intermediate nodes parse the received Route Requests in 
order to determine whether an SRP header is present. If not, 
they process the packet as described in the basis protocol 
specification. Otherwise, the intermediate nodes extract the 
QID. The source and the destination addresses are also 
extracted in order to create an entry in the query table. 
Queries with QID matching one of the table entries for the 
same pair of end nodes are discarded. Otherwise, the 
intermediate nodes re-broadcast the route request.  
Intermediate nodes also measure the frequency of queries 
received from their neighbors, in order to regulate the query 
propagation process. On one hand, all nodes self-regulate 
the generation of new route requests, in order to maintain 
the control traffic overhead low. On the other hand, 
malicious nodes probably act selfishly and avoid backing off 
before generating a new route query, or generate queries at 
the highest possible rate, consuming network resources and 
degrading the routing protocol performance.  
In order to guarantee the responsiveness of the routing 
protocol, each benign node maintains a priority ranking of 
its neighbors according to the corresponding observed rate 
of queries. The highest priority is assigned to the nodes 
generating (or relaying) requests with the lowest rate, and 
the lowest priority to the neighbors that generate queries 
more frequently. Then, quanta are allocated proportionally 
to the priorities and within each class queries are serviced in 
a round-robin manner.  
As immediate neighbors of a malicious node observe a 
high rate of incoming queries, they update the corresponding 
weight (priority). Moreover, not serviced low priority 
queries are eventually discarded. In this way, non-malicious 
queries are only affected for a time period equal to the time 
it takes to detect and update the priority assigned to a 
misbehaving neighbor. At the same time, the round-robin 
operation provides additional assurance that benign requests 
will propagate as well. More importantly, the filtering of the 
suspected requests will be performed close to the potential 
source of misbehavior, and benign nodes farther away from 
the adversary will not be affected, as they will have to relay 
fabricated queries at a lower rate.  
 
D.3. Route Reply 
T validates the received route request packet, by first 
verifying that it has originated from a node with which it has 
a security binding. Then, Qseq is compared to Smax, the 
maximum query sequence number received from S, within 
the lifetime of the SA. If Qseq ≤  Smax, the request is discarded 
as outdated or replayed. Otherwise, T calculates the keyed 
hash of the request fields. If the output matches the SRP 
header MAC, the integrity of this request is verified, along 
with the authenticity of its origin.  
The destination generates a number of replies to valid 
requests, at most as many as the number of its neighbors, in 
order to disallow a possibly malicious neighbor to control 
multiple replies. For each valid request, T places the 
accumulated route in the route reply packet and the QID and 
Qseq of the route request in the corresponding SRP header 
fields, so that S can verify the freshness of the reply. The 
MAC covers the basis protocol route reply and the rest of the 
SRP header, protects the integrity of the reply on its way to 
the source and offers evidence to S that the request has 
indeed reached the destination.  
An alternative, more efficient implementation would be 
for the destination (T) to source-route a reply with an empty 
payload. The SRP header Type indicates that the packet is a 
reply, the source-route of the datagram contains the sought 
route reversed, and the MAC covers the IP source-route, as 
created by T. If the reply is deemed valid, S extracts the 
node sequence from the reply IP source-route and reverses 
it, in order to create the S→T route, or, simply decomposes 
it into its constituent links.  
 
D.4. Route Reply Validation 
On reception of a Route Reply, S checks the source and 
destination addresses, QID and Qseq and discards the Route 
Reply if it does not correspond to the currently pending 
query. Otherwise, it compares the reply IP source-route with 
the reverse of the route carried in the reply payload. If the 
two routes match, S calculates the MAC using the replied 
route, the SRP header fields and KS,T. Upon successful 
verification, S is assured that the request, indeed, reached T 
and that the reply was not corrupted on its way from T to S. 
Moreover, since the reply packet has been routed and 
successfully received over the reverse of the route it carries, 
the route information has not been compromised during the 
request propagation; i.e., before arriving at T. Thus, the 
connectivity information is genuine.   
If the alternative form of reply with empty payload is 
returned, it is sufficient to validate the MAC, since the IP 
source-route provides the (reversed) route itself and implies 
that the reply arrived over this route. Moreover, if an 
intermediate node V having an SA with S provides a reply, 
the route suffix is accepted as genuine. In other words, V is 
trusted to provide a correct V→T route, and the above-
mentioned checks are performed for the S→V route 
segment. If this is proven to be genuine, then the entire route 
is deemed genuine.  
 
D.5. Intermediate Node Replies  
The caching of overheard routes is a severe vulnerability, 
since false topology information can be easily disseminated 
throughout a large portion of the network. A malicious node 
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can fabricate data packets or route replies, which are, for 
example, cached by nodes operating in promiscuous mode. 
When such routes are used or provided as replies, more 
unsuspecting nodes cache such invalid routes and may use 
them in the future. 
In order to achieve the required robustness, route caching 
is not encouraged in general and intermediate nodes are not 
required to provide route replies. However, we realize that 
route caching can improve the effectiveness of the route 
discovery process. As such, if an intermediate node V has an 
active route to T and an SA exists between S and V, then, a 
reply could be provided to S. This is the only case that the 
route request does not actually reach the destination.  
This extension of the SRP functionality is enabled by the 
Intermediate Node Reply Token (INRT) (Fig. 4), and we 
propose here two alternative designs. Let KG be a group key, 
i.e., a secret shared by the members of a small group of 
nodes that S belongs to. At the same time, S and T, as every 
pair of the group nodes, have established an SA, i.e., share a 
secret key, as previously discussed. Then, INRT is merely 
the keyed hash of the route request message, calculated 
exactly as in D.1, apart from the fact that the key is KG, 
instead of KS,T. Any group node, namely V, that has an 
active route to T validates the request based on INRT and 
generates the reply, as described in D.3, using KS,V. 
Alternatively, instead of extending the header, the source 
node could simply use KG for the MAC calculation. This 
would be a plausible solution only if T belonged to the 
group as well.  
 
0                           1                 2                            3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
SRP Header 
IN Reply Token 
 
Figure 4. Extended SRP Header: the INRT allows 
intermediate group member nodes to validate the request 
and provide a reply. 
 
A different method would be to calculate INRT as a 
digital signature; i.e., the hash of the route request encrypted 
with the private key of S. Then, any receiving node can 
validate the request and provide the reply. This mode would 
be useful in a scenario that a node does not belong to a 
group but still is securely associated with nodes other than 
T. 
 
D.6. Route Maintenance 
This function, though not directly related to the route 
discovery, is an integral part of most MANET routing 
protocols. Topology changes have to be detected and the 
sources of the affected routes have to be notified, while 
avoiding false or fabricated notifications. This task is 
facilitated by the fact that intermediate node caching is 
disabled, but route error messages must be retained even if 
SMT is used in conjunction with SRP. The SMT 
acknowledgments allow for enhanced detection of any type 
of transmission failures. However, this end-to-end approach 
does not allow distinguishing benign (due to topology 
changes) from malicious route failures.  
Thus, route error messages generated by intermediate 
nodes are retained in SRP, in order to provide fast detection 
of path breakages. The route error packets are source-routed 
along the prefix of the route reported as broken, and S 
compares the route traversed by the error message to the 
prefix of the corresponding route. In this way, it can verify 
that the provided route error feedback refers to the actual 
route and is not generated by a node that is not part of the 
route: The correctness of the feedback (i.e., whether it 
reports an actual failure to forward a packet) cannot be 
verified.  
For example, in Fig.1, if the route {S,1,4,T} had been 
chosen, M2 could simply generate a route error reporting the 
(4,T) link breakage, even though the route was intact. In 
order to get the error message to S, M2 has to source-route it 
to S, and it does so over {M2,4,1,S} for example. Even 
though node 4 may not discard such a message5, S will 
compare the source-route of the error message to the route 
reported as broken, or more specifically, the (reverse) 
segment reaching the broken link. The comparison fails, and 
the feedback is discarded, since S infers that an outlying 
node generated the route. 
A malicious node lying on an S→T route can at most 
invalidate the route, mislead S by corrupting error messages 
generated by another node, or by masking a dropped packet 
as a link failure. Consequently, a malicious node can harm 
only the route it belongs, something that is possible in the 
first place if it simply dropped or corrupted data packets. On 
the other hand, it is important that under normal conditions 
the responsiveness of the protocol remains high. 
 
E. PROTOCOL CORRECTNESS PROOF 
This section presents a formal analysis of the protocol 
and verifies that the stated goals are achieved. The analysis 
follows the methodology of [25]. Based on a set of 
assumptions, the current beliefs of the participating 
principals are derived from their initial beliefs and 
possessions. In particular, we follow the notation and 
                                               
5
 In fact, this is not required and it would pose additional 
processing overhead to intermediate nodes. On the other 
hand, node 4 could not accept to forward a packet fabricated 
by M2, spoofing 4’s address, in order to convince S that the 
route message originated from node 4.  
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inference rules in [26], and the Appendix provides a concise 
reference to the used notation.  
The protocol is abstracted as the exchange of two 
messages, a route request and a route reply. The messages 
are transmitted over a public channel; i.e., a sequence of 
intermediate nodes that may cause any impairment. The 
idealized form (i.e., the protocol with parts of the messages 
that do not contribute to the participants’ beliefs omitted) is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
QS,T is the route request and H is the Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) function. The relevant fields of 
QS,T are the sequence number Qseq, and the source and 
destination node addresses. As for the route reply, denoted 
as RS,T, the Qseq field binds RS,T to the corresponding QS,T, 
and route is the actual route along which  T returns the 
reply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Idealized SRP: the protocol viewed as an 
exchange of two messages, without the fields that do not 
contribute to the participants’ beliefs.  
 
The initial assumptions are: 
(i) )(#|,,|,
,,,
,
TSTS
K
TS NSNSTSSKS TS ≡∋ →←≡∋  
The sender possesses the shared key and it believes it is 
used for mutual proofs of identity between S and T. It 
possesses NS,T, the newly generated sequence number, and 
believes that NS,T  has not been used before.  
(ii) pTSKTS NTTSTKT TS ,, ,|, , ∋ →←≡∋  
The receiver also trusts the shared secret, possesses the 
set of sequence numbers seen in the past and believes they 
were once uttered by S ( p TSp TS NSTNT ,, |~|, ≡  ). If the 
message (1) is the first transmission from S to T (within the 
lifetime of the SA) the set of past sequence numbers is 
merely the Qseq initialized at the SA establishment. 
Otherwise, the SA state justifies such a belief, which is our 
basis hypothesis. Moreover, S and T believe they are able to 
recognize QS,T and RS,T, respectively. 6  
(iii) )),(,(|)),,(,(|
,,,,,, TSTSTSTSTSTS KQHQTKRHRS ⊗≡⊗≡  
For message (1), we have:  
(iv) 
)),(,(
)),(,(
 and )),(,(
)),(,(
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
TSTSTS
TSTSTS
TSTSTS
TSTSTS
KQHQT
KQHQT
KQHQT
KQHQT
∋
∗ 


  
                                               
6
 Due to the fixed-size headers fields and the well-defined 
structure of control traffic packets 
i.e., T sees a packet with the “not-originate-here” property, 
that is, it can distinguish, acting as a receiver, whether it has 
previously transmitted the packet in the current run. 
(v)
seq
IDseq
TSTSTS
TSTSTS
QT
QQT
KQHTQT
KQHQT
∋
∋
∋∋
∋ ),(
,),(,
)),(,(
 
,,,
,,,
  
Similarly to (v), we infer that T possesses the rest of the 
fields of QS,T. From (i) and (v), using the simple mechanism 
explained in D.3, T verifies that p
TSseq NQ ,∉ . 
Consequently, (vi) )(#| seqQT ≡ , T believes that the message 
(including the fields that are omitted here) is fresh. Then, 
from (i), (iii), (iv), (vi), we get: 
(vii)
),(|~|),,(|~|
),(#|
,|),,(),,(
,,,,
,,
,
,,,,
TSTSTSTS
TSTS
TSK
TSTSTSTS
KQHSTKQST
KQT
TSTKQTKQHT
≡≡
≡
 →←≡∋

  
This signifies the belief that both the packet payload and 
the MAC originate from S. Along with freshness (vi), we 
have the sought goal satisfied. We should note that the last 
inference does not imply that the sender revealed the shared 
key. In fact, the confirmation is independent of this issue. 
Moreover, we have assumed that none of the two principals 
compromises the shared secret by exposing it.7  
Similarly, for message (2), we get: 
(viii) 
seq
IDseq
TSTSTS
TSTSTS
QS
routeQQS
KRHSRS
KRHRS
∋
∋
∋∋
∋ ),,(
,),(,
)),(,(
 
,,,
,,,
  
(ix) 
),(#|
)(#|
 
routeQS
QS
seq
seq
≡
≡
  
And finally 
(x) 
),(|~|),,(|~|
),(#|
,|),,(),,(
,,,,
,,
,
,,,,
TSTSTSTS
TSTS
TSK
TSTSTSTS
KRHTSKRTS
KRS
TSSKRSKRHS
≡≡
≡
 →←≡∋

 
Accordingly, S believes that the entire route reply 
datagram originates from T and is fresh and, trivially, that T 
has constructed route, i.e., the source-route of the reply 
packet. The assumption of the non-colluding nodes implies 
that there is no alternative way for the route reply to arrive, 
but the one defined in the source-route. Moreover, the reply 
is the path along which the route request had propagated, 
which implies that the reply content had not been 
manipulated prior to its construction by T. Thus, its arrival 
at S implies that the corresponding connectivity information 
is correct.  
By updating the state at both ends, we can repeat the 
above reasoning to conclude that, if the source increments 
Qseq and does not repeat it within the lifetime of a SA, the 
                                               
7
 KS,T is used solely during the lifetime of the S,T SA.  
S  
 
(1) QS,T, H{(QS,T,KS,T)}  
 (2) {RS,T,route}, H{(RS,T,route,KS,T)}  
 
T 
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sought goals are achieved, including the preservation of 
message integrity. In a very similar manner, this conclusion 
can be reached for the case of replies generated by 
intermediate nodes, under the assumption that the route 
suffix will be correct.8 
 
F. DISCUSSION 
An interesting characteristic of the proposed here 
protocol is that it is essentially immune to IP spoofing. Any 
intermediate node may use any arbitrary IP address when 
queried but, as shown by the previous discussion, the 
protocol is capable of capturing the correct and current 
connectivity snapshot. However, in practice, neighbor 
discovery that maintains information on the binding of the 
Medium Access Control and IP addresses of nodes can 
strengthen the protocol. For example, the priority 
mechanism (D.2) would become more effective if packets 
were discarded when relayed by the same data link 
interface, i.e., the same Medium Access Control address, 
with more than one different IP addresses. Then, a malicious 
node would not be able to forge different IP address in 
different packets it relays, or, in other words, mask its 
misbehavior by appearing as a number of different nodes, 
and thus avoid being delegated to a lower priority.    
Nevertheless, the issue of fair utilization of the network 
resources and possible ways to dismay nodes from 
broadcasting at the highest possible rate is beyond the scope 
of the security of routing protocols. For example, a 
malicious node could simply use IP broadcast instead of the 
route discovery querying mechanism. It is important though 
to defend nodes from attacks that exploit the protocol itself, 
and SRP provides protection against clogging DoS attacks. 
The replay protection at the end nodes, the use of the 
computationally inexpensive HMAC and the avoidance, in 
general, of any cryptographic validation by intermediate 
nodes are such features. These features are complemented 
by the scheme that regulates the propagation of queries. As a 
thought for future work, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether the use of soft state at intermediate 
nodes would further contribute to the protocol efficiency in 
a non-benign environment.   
Moreover, it is important that the application of SRP does 
not severely affect the efficiency of the basis protocol under 
benign conditions. On one hand, in the same MANET 
subnet, nodes that implement SRP can co-exist with nodes 
that do not. In the absence of adversaries, the only overhead 
would be imposed on the nodes executing SRP. On the other 
hand, possible optimizations incorporated into the basics 
protocol can retain the effectiveness of the protocol in 
                                               
8
 The only way to avoid this assumption is to force the 
query to reach the destination. See section F. for a 
discussion on the trade-offs of this type of operation.  
conjunction with SRP; an example is route shortening [8] 
that can be applied during the query propagation phase, 
based on knowledge of an active route. Finally, the fixed 
transmission overhead of 24 (or 27) bytes per control packet 
becomes less significant as wireless network speeds increase 
to above the current state-of-the-art of 11Mbps. 
As shown above, the basic form of SRP that requires the 
propagation of queries to the destination is robust to 
malicious behavior. It is noteworthy that this statement 
remains true, in the absence of collusion, even if the 
destination node attempted to provide false replies. On the 
other hand, the provision of replies from intermediate nodes 
can achieve the same level of assurance only if a trusted 
node is assumed to provide a correct route segment. The 
reason is that even if some type of HMAC or signature from 
T were placed in the reply by V, it would still be possible for 
a stale V→T route segment to be provided, given that S 
cannot be assured of the V↔T state. In practice, the usage of 
the SA-specific key (i.e., KS,V) for such replies limits the 
effects of this potential residual vulnerability. 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient secure routing 
protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that guarantees the 
discovery of correct connectivity information over an 
unknown network, in the presence of malicious nodes. The 
protocol introduces a set of features, such as the requirement 
that the query verifiably arrives at the destination, the 
explicit binding of network and routing layer functionality, 
the consequent verifiable return of the query response over 
the reverse of the query propagation route, the acceptance of 
route error messages only when generated by nodes on the 
actual route, the query/reply identification by a dual 
identifier, the replay protection of the source and destination 
nodes and the regulation of the query propagation.  
The resultant protocol is capable of operating without the 
existence of an on-line certification authority or the 
complete knowledge of keys of all network nodes. Its sole 
requirement is that any two nodes that wish to communicate 
securely can simply establish a priori a shared secret, to be 
used by their routing protocol modules. Moreover, the 
correctness of the protocol is retained irrespective of any 
permanent binding of nodes to IP addresses, a feature of 
increased importance for the open, dynamic, and 
cooperative MANET environments. 
 
APPENDIX 
The basic notation used in E. is provided here, as in [26]. 
X and Y are formulas, P and Q are principals, K is a shared 
secret and C is a statement.  
• (X,Y): conjunction of two formulas; it is treated as a set 
with properties of associativity and commutativity. 
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• *X: Not-originated-here formula property. If P is told X 
(see below), it can distinguish it did not previously convey 
X in the current run.  
• H(X): a one-way function of X. 
 
Basic Statements 
• XP   : P is told formula X.  
• XP ∋ : P possesses or is capable of possessing formula 
X.  
• XP |~ : P once conveyed formula X. 
• )(#| XP ≡ : P believes or is entitled to believe that 
formula X is fresh.  
• )(| XP ϕ≡ : P believes or is entitled to believe that 
formula X is recognizable, that is, P has certain 
expectations about the contents of X before actually 
receiving it.  
• QPP K→←≡| : P believes or is entitled to believe that 
K is a suitable secret for P and Q.  
• C1,C2: conjunction of two statements, treated as a set 
with properties of associativity and commutativity.  
• CP ≡| : P believes or is entitled to believe that statement 
C holds.  
• The horizontal line separating two statements or 
conjunctions of statements signifies that the upper 
statement implies the lower one. For example, 
XP
YXP

 ),(
 reads: P being told a formula implies P being 
told each of the formula’s concatenated components.  
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